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中国现代史研究

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中国现代史学会成立于1980年,是经民政部批准的全国性的一级学会,至今已经有35年的历史。现主管单位为中共中央党校。

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中国抗日战争与现代国际关系国际学术研讨会论文选登之四  

2013-11-29 15:46:08|  分类: 研究论文 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

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抗战时期驻华美军士兵和技术顾问与中国的士兵(三)

Zach Fredman(傅知行


And nothing provoked a harsher response from Chinese than being treated like American blacks. Hong Zhang’s work on the postwar U.S. Marine mission in north China showed that Chinese criticism of American prejudice also revealed Chinese anti-black racism.[1] Interpreter recollections from the CBI Theater reinforce her point. Segregated movie theaters and service disgusted the interpreters who served at rear area bases in India. The sight of white engineering officers ordering black enlisted men about on the Stilwell Road also left a bad impression on them.  But these experiences did not engender a sense of equality or camaraderie with this other marginalized group. In Ledo, home to the main American airbase in Assam, a few Chinese troops opened fire on GIs after the Americans forced the Chinese to sit with black troops in the back of a movie theater.[2] At the frontline near Longling in southern Yunnan, Zhang Zhiliang (张之良) and other interpreters refused American orders to eat with black troops.[3] The fury at being equated with blacks reflected longstanding racial views in Republican China. Although disturbed by American racism after his 1903 tour of the United States, reformist intellectual Liang Qichao also wrote, “there is something despicable about the behavior of blacks. They would die nine times over without regret if they could possess a white woman’s flesh.”[4] Republican Era textbooks posited the same views of essential black inferiority as popularized by western eugenicists. As Frank Dikotter has argued, one would need a dredger to gather up all the racial clichés and stereotypes that abounded in both China and the west during the interwar years.[5] Being treated like American blacks was simply too much to bear.

       Other disputes over equality centered on food, rank, living conditions, and pay. Theodore White might have thought the Chinese troops ate well at Ramgarh, but most interpreters loathed American rations, especially the tinned beef and pork, which they called “shit tins (大便罐头).”[6] But when Chinese interpreters and troops didn’t get the shit tins they were entitled to, quarrels broke out. This was another example of unequal treatment, as was the tendency of some Americans to ignore Chinese interpreters’ officer ranks.[7] Americans liaison officers often lived in far more comfortable housing than Chinese officers and took their western standards of living for granted, with little thought about how this would influence their interactions with the Chinese.[8] And though interpreters earned high salaries by Chinese standards, they still made less than American privates.

       Perhaps the most widespread disputes among American soldiers and Chinese in general—not just interpreters—involved sex and alcohol. When American soldiers got drunk, behaved recklessly, and slept with prostitutes, it evoked memories of the treaty ports, where extraterritoriality protected Americans from Chinese law. Toward the end of the war violence even erupted in Chongqing when locals got fed up with seeing regular Chinese women riding around in jeeps with GIs.[9] But problems with sex and alcohol had caused trouble between interpreters and soldiers long before 1945. Interpreters noted that Chinese living near hostels had to deal with drunkenness and sexual harassment. And both GIs and interpreters recalled that some American soldiers in Kunming were drunk nearly every day. He Xianglin admitted that “there were good and bad people” among the American soldiers, “including men of low character who drank to excess and would pick fights for no reason at all.”[10] Alcohol and prostitution caused even more trouble after the war ended and the U.S. Marines landed in north China.  But a closer look at interaction in Kunming reveals that Chinese often contributed to this problem.

       Chinese liquor retailers and black marketers were eager to meet American demand, as were Chinese pimps and madams. Upon his arrival in Kunming, Lieutenant Sidney Rittenberg recalled Chinese officers offering him prostitutes.[11] Enlisted man Kenneth Miller wrote that a local madam “would bring a covey of girls to the back gate in the wall for amorous purposes” outside their hostel each night.[12] Providing soldiers with alcohol was another profitable enterprise. Liquor retailers did brisk business on Kunming’s Nanping Jie, which locals nicknamed “GI Street,” sometimes selling alcohol stolen from the Army hostels.[13] One hostel manager, Huang Kangkai (黄慷慨), ran a liquor business on the side with a foreign partner who managed a bar. His profits were enough to tempt a roommate to break into his locker and earn himself a five-year prison sentence for stealing U.S. $191, over 140,000 Chinese yuan, and a few thousand in other denominations.[14] And while many American soldiers drank excessively, others complained about the tendency of Chinese officers to turn dinners with GIs into drinking bouts in which the Chinese outnumbered and ganged up on their American guests.[15]

       The huge influx of wealth GIs brought with them to China offered opportunity to locals willing to cater to American vice. It also provided American soldiers with entrée into the thriving local black market. As the journalist and Office of War Information reporter Graham Peck observed, “the black market in US army supplies could not have flourished without American help.”[16] American involvement in Yunnan’s underground economy began early, with ex-AVG men looting the docks in Rangoon in the spring of 1942 with plans to smuggle their contraband into Kunming.[17] Kunming reached its historical apogee as a trading center during the war, fueled by dollars, Lend-Lease aid, and smuggled goods coming in over the Hump.[18] GIs sold cigarettes, leather jackets, aviator sunglasses, and uniforms. They also speculated in the currency trade.[19] So while many of them complained bitterly of Chinese theft and corruption, they played an overwhelming role in making it possible.

Conclusions

       In their oral histories and memoirs, most soldiers and interpreters judged wartime U.S.-Chinese military cooperation as reasonably successful, despite the problems they encountered. As the War Area Service Corps and the U.S. Army anticipated, the chief difficulties in relations between American soldiers and Chinese interpreters derived from the latter feeling that the Americans did not respect the Chinese as equals. But as an alliance between a besieged, poverty-stricken, and divided civilization and the world’s leading industrial and economic power, the relationship was inherently unequal. This central contradiction meant that tensions in wartime U.S.-China relations were never far from the surface, but it did not preclude cooperative ties between soldiers and interpreters. Thousands of Americans met a Chinese for the first time during the war, and many of them got to know individual interpreters quite well.

      The War Area Service Corps and Foreign Affairs Bureau interpreter training programs made an essential contribution to the Chinese-American war effort. Mei Yiqi was right: the interpreters enabled Americans in China, India, and Burma to do their jobs. Scholars like Zhang Baijia and Maochun Yu have called the Flying Tigers of the AVG and the U.S. 14th Air Force the finest chapter of U.S.-Chinese wartime cooperation.[20] They may still be right, but China’s interpreters deserve greater consideration when evaluating the wartime alliance. After all, the 14th Air Force relied on interpreters to gather and translate intelligence, coordinate activities between American and Chinese command, and assist pilots and ground crews both on and off duty. These young men also enabled more than 50,000 Chinese soldiers to train in India, over 26,000 to graduate from Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) guerilla warfare courses throughout China, and tens of thousands more to study at the various training centers in Yunnan. These troops were victorious in the Second Burma and West Yunnan campaigns, where interpreters linked American liaison teams to Chinese military units in order to provide air support.[21] Looking beyond combat history, interpreters also allowed American advisors to work with the Chinese on activities ranging from airport and road construction to the improvement of China’s potato agriculture.

       When examining interactions among interpreters and soldiers from their own memoirs and oral histories, we get a better idea about the difficulties on the ground. Interpreters’ accusations of racism and unfair treatment point to real problems. High-level advisors like Herbert Yardley, who helped build Dai Li’s cryptanalysis program, found the Chinese “mechanically stupid and lazy.”[22] Regular troops referred to the Chinese as “slope heads,” and occasionally those who injured or killed Chinese in car accidents found the whole situation humorous.[23] Racism was real, and the friction it caused between American soldiers and Chinese interpreters reflected the failure of American society to eradicate racial discrimination. But at the same time, interpreters’ accusations of racism were sometimes misplaced.

       Behaviors that Chinese interpreters attributed to racism or American contempt for the Chinese also occurred in wartime England. As GIs poured into Britain to prepare for the invasion of France, sex, drunkenness, and violence were the biggest causes for complaint with troops on liberty. Like the Chinese government, the British also agreed to exempt U.S. troops from their own legal system. GIs in Britain also ate much better than British soldiers and enjoyed more comfortable leisure facilities at which the British were not always welcome. These characteristics also defined the boomtowns surrounding American military bases in Europe and Asia during the Cold War. But a key difference in wartime Britain and China was that American command in Britain, particularly under General Dwight Eisenhower, sough to form a genuine partnership.[24] The same cannot be said for Joseph Stilwell in China.

But as in wartime Britain, the relationships between Chinese and Americans mirrored underlying contrasts between the two countries. As students trained largely by American-educated faculty, Chinese interpreters recognized they could learn a lot from the United States and that the U.S. was the only military power that could really support China. But as well-educated, historically-conscious Chinese nationalists, they had little time for arrogance or disrespect. So long as Americans acted in accordance with their national ideology—treating all men as equals—and avoiding the patronizing arrogance of the treaty port era, China’s wartime interpreters felt confident about the alliance.

(作者为波士顿大学历史系博士毕业;2012年英国剑桥大学访问学者)



[1] Zhang, America Perceived, 42.

[2]梁家佑: 《打鬼子去!》,第32 页。

[3] 张之良:《滇西的给养站》,《国立西南联合大学八百学子从军回忆》第159页。

[4] Liang Qichao, “The Power and Threat of America (1903),” Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of American from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present, translated and edited by R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 91.

[5] Frank Dikotter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 143, 162-163.

[6]卢少忱:《在后方医院受闲气》,第86页。Luckily for the interpreters in northern India, Chinese entrepreneurs opened restaurants there.

[7] ibid., 顾书荣:《美军的“中国”给养站》《国立西南联合大学八百学子从军回忆》第98-99页。

[8] Gallicchio, “The Other China Hands,” 61-62.

[9] See 重庆市长贺耀组令人事处,19456月,关于取缔中国女子搭载美军人员吉普车,重庆市档案馆存,0053.0002.00179.

[10]贺祥麟:《翻译生涯不是战场,也是战场》第24 页。See also 郭冠球:《两次应征去美军招待所当翻译》,第19-20页;江人和:《为史迪威前方指挥部服务德通讯兵》,第81页;Robert Quigley Oral History Interview, (VHP).

[11] Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 18.

[12] Kenneth Miller Memoir, AFC/2001/001/1623 X, (VHP) Library of Congress, Washington DC.

[13]为拟判陆志成等盗卖共有财物案, 1945年8月22,军事委员会军法执行总监部西南军事运输军法执行监部判决, 云南省档案馆存,1054.18.56.     

[14]昆明区主任施副主任樊[?]钧鉴前据本所外员宿舍领班黄慷慨七月二十一日报告称 19458月),云南省档案馆存,1054.18.56.

[15] See Jan Peeke to Anne Peeke, January 31, 1944, April 18, 1944, July 18, 1944, Alonzo Jan Peeke Personal Correspondence, (VHP); Arthur Rounds Oral History, AFC/2001/001/54316, (VHP), Library of Congress, Washington DC;

[16] Graham Peck, Two Kinds of Time (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008),  636.

[17] Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941-1942 (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2007), 199-200.

[18] 车辚:《抗战时期云南地下经济》,《云南财经大学学报》2012年第二期(总第154期):12-15期。

[19] Joe Virgilio Oral History Interview AFC/2001/001/68485; John Salerno Oral History Interview, AFC/2001/001/47924; Henry Wofford Oral History Interview AFC/2001/001/73037; Whitney Greenberg Oral History Interview, AFC/2001/001/51147, all in (VHP), Library of Congress, Washington DC.

[20] Maochun Yu, The Dragon’s War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937-1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 45; Zhang Baijia, “China’s Quest for Foreign Military Aid,” in Mark Peattie, Hans van de Ven and Edward Drea, eds., The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 300.

[21] Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 127; Frederick Wakeman, Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2003), 294; Westad, Restless Empire, 268. Mainland scholars have begun revising SACO’s controversial history. Gong Xiaoxia concludes that SACO guerillas were devoted to fighting the Japanese and not the Communists, and that they played a vital role in the war against Japan. See洪小夏:《抗日战争时期中美合作所论析》,《抗日战争研究》2007 年第3 期)第59-87页。

[22] Herbert Yardley, The Chinese Black Chamber, 52.

[23] See, for example Rittenberg, The Man Who Stayed Behind, 18; Peck, Two Kinds of Time, 377; Jan Peeke to Anne Peeke, 12/3/1942, (VHP), Library of Congress, Washington DC.

[24] David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1995), 30-31, 64-66, 95, 146. 

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